## Projections of Ageing Migrant populations in France and England and Wales

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While ageing of European populations is abundantly documented, there is a lack of quantitative data on elderly migrant populations that represents an important component of EU populations and are believed to contribute to limit ageing. There is almost no projection of older migrant populations available, with no EU projection and even no national projection for most of EU member states, except for England and Wales (Lievesley 2010).

Ageing migrant projections are necessary to assess future needs in social and health care and old-age dependency of culturally diverse populations. They are also useful to understand changes in intergenerational transfers and support. How will elderly migrants with small pensions rely on their children and, on the opposite, how retired migrants will be able to assist their children for care and education of their grand' children? Further, there are issues in household composition, co-residence with elderly parents, lifestyles, informal activities, culture transmission, etc.

The coming years and decades will see the arrival at retirement ages of the large 1960s and 1970s migrant cohorts. This will result in rapid increases in elderly migrants. Migration flows at older ages are small but they will nevertheless impact on migrant ageing. The most commonly mentioned is return migration of retirees, but migrants tend to return less than they planned. There are also inflows of elderly migrants: family reunification, arrival of the '0 G', and independent migrants, lone or couples, who come with pensions from their own country, to live more or less permanently with their migrant children or to access better medical facilities.

This paper will briefly present the socio-economic characteristics of older migrants, the issues at stake with population ageing and aspects of old-age mobility. It will mostly provide projection data on older migrants in France, based on the component method. Special attention will be devoted to the different situations according to age, sex and origin. French results will be compared with those for England and Wales as regards trends in numbers of older migrants by origin.

### 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of older migrants

The major issues in migrant ageing stem from their household and employment situations, mostly for non-EU migrants.

### 1.1. Household situation

	65 +		75+		85+	
	F	М	F	М	F	М
Portugal	25.8	9.7	34.5	14.5	29.9	21.6
Italia	41.4	15.8	49.6	18.9	53.7	25.4
Spain	36.9	16.0	45.2	19.1	49.7	26.7
'other EU'	42.4	17.4	52.4	21.2	54.5	27.0
'other Europe'	38.9	18.5	47.4	22.6	48.5	25.6
Algeria	25.6	14.3	34.4	15.3	32.6	18.4
Morocco	26.2	10.9	36.1	12.1	38.2	16.0
Tunisia	36.4	14.8	47.8	15.9	52.6	21.2
'other Africa'	28.4	13.2	32.9	16.0	30.1	20.4
Turkey	27.3	9.5	41.9	16.5	52.7	21.2
'others	29.7	15.2	35.0	17.3	31.5	21.3
France	41.6	17.5	49.6	20.4	51.5	26.4

Table 1: proportion (%) of older migrants living alone (one-person households)

Source: Census 2008, France

Older migrants often live alone, mostly women due to earlier widowhood than males. Between 25% and 40%, according to origin, of females 65 years-old and above live in oneperson households while between 10% and 20% of males are in similar situations (table 1). Among the oldest-old, often more than half of females and between 20% and 27% of males live alone. However, non-EU migrants live less frequently alone than the national average, except among the oldest-old for Tunisian and Turk females.

Elderly female migrants live less frequently in institutions (non-private households) than national average. But male migrants, mostly Africans below 85 years-old, are more often institutionalized than national average (table 2). However, the oldest-old migrants of both sexes from 'other European countries' and Algeria tend to live almost as often in institutions as national average.

Table 2:	proportion	(%) o	f older	migrants	living i	in i	institutions	(non-	private	househol	lds)
		· ·		0	0			\	1		

	65 +		75+		85+	
	F	М	F	М	F	Μ
Portugal	1.7	1.4	4.4	2.7	12.8	6.4
Italia	5.3	2.2	7.9	3.6	16.3	8.6
Spain	4.9	2.3	7.7	3.5	16.9	8.0
'other EU'	6.4	2.7	10.2	4.2	18.7	8.8
'other Europe'	7.2	2.8	12.8	5.3	23.5	11.8
Algeria	3.7	13.9	8.9	14.2	24.9	12.6
Morocco	1.8	7.9	4.8	10.1	13.1	9.1
Tunisia	3.8	8.1	6.7	5.8	15.3	5.4
'other Africa'	6.1	17.2	13.9	13.1	35.6	16.5
Turkey	2.6	3.0	5.7	2.5	13.1	4.8
'other countries'	5.0	3.6	8.1	4.7	17.8	7.7
France	7.0	4.0	11.4	6.1	24.9	13.8

Source: Census 2008, France

Isolation of large proportions of elderly migrants have important health and social implications as these people may become sick and not seek medical treatment until their health has deteriorated. They usually do not receive support from relatives.

The situation of elderly migrants in institutions is also a concern due to the lack of amenities in the poorest of those institutions. Some of these institutions are called 'mourroir', a place where people just wait to die.

### 1.2. Pension entitlement

Table 3: proportion (%) of older migrants who are retired or inactive (at home or out of labour force), ages 65-74 years.

	Retired		at home or not	in LF
	F	М	F	М
Portugal	87.4	96.2	8.3	0.9
Italia	79.7	96.4	18.1	0.8
Spain	87.1	96.4	10.8	0.7
other EU'	83.6	91.9	12.2	1.5
other Europe'	85.3	90.4	10.3	2.1
Algeria	63.2	94.1	34.6	2.5
Morocco	65.9	92.3	30.5	2.3
Tunisia	77.4	91.5	20.0	2.0
Other Africa'	69.4	82.9	24.1	6.1
Turkey	61.0	91.2	37.3	3.8
other countries'	71.9	81.2	21.1	4.8
France	90.7	95.5	7.0	1.0

Source: Census 2008, France

A smaller proportion of non-EU migrant males are retired (receiving a pension) than national average (95.5%), mostly for 'other Africans' and 'other countries (table 3). Non-European migrant females are much less frequently receiving pensions, between 60% and 72%, except for Tunisians, than national average (90.7%). And the proportion of non European migrant females who are 'at home' or inactive is above 20%, reaching 37% for Turks. Thus, many migrant couples rely on only one pension to support themselves. Among migrants living alone or in institutions, 11% to 21% of females and 5% to 12% of males, according to origin, have no pension and live only from social benefits – against national averages of 4.4% for females and 2.5% for males. Precariousness and poverty are frequent among older migrants, hindering family life and social activities, with negative effects on well-being and health.

# 2.- The mobility approach

The focus on foreign migrants based on census data limits our mobility approach to international migration. However, it consists in very interesting types of movements, including return migration and also immigration. Immigration at older ages is mostly family reunification for workers who decide to stay after retirement and bring their wives. It can also be the '0 generation': parents of working migrants who join their children to help them take care of grand children. Thus, ageing does not mean immobility, mostly for the younger elderly: below 65 or up to 70 years old. It does not even mean reduced mobility as regards out-migration, due to rather high return migration rates. But it is reduced or lower mobility for elderly people migrating North comparatively to young adult ages.

There are important sex differentials in mobility at older ages.

Out migration rates are often higher for males than for females, because lone working males tend to return to home countries after retirement. Men who migrated with - or were later joined - by their wives return less. Thus, return migration rates by sex are related with the characteristics of male and female migrants as regards economic activity, family situation and also income.

Immigration rates are much higher for females than for males. This is due to late family reunification and also to larger proportions of females among the '0 generation', because women can help take care of young children. These trends are also related to higher number of surviving females than males.

Migrants often change their mind about return migration. For instance, married men who are alone can chose not to return home after retirement and bring their wives (late family reunification). Couples can choose to stay to remain closer to their children. Migrants with higher income can choose a kind of bi-residence after retirement.

Old age migration has also implications for health and social services. '0 generation' migrants and women recently entered through family reunification are most often less fluent in host country language and have less knowledge of existing health and social services. However their spouse or children can inform them. Still, they have more difficulties to communicate with medical staff. Altogether, among all migrants, extreme situations are found between those who managed to reach a high way of life and those who remain in poverty. Unfortunately, projections do not enable us to estimate populations by socio-economic characteristics or with specific needs of social and health services.

## 3.- Methodology

The main components of ageing of migrant populations are their current age-structure, future migration rates and survival rates. The shapes of the age-pyramids tell us a lot about current and future ageing. The size of migrant cohorts who will arrive at ages above 65 years in the next decades is often increasing rapidly following larger migration waves in the 1960s and 1970s. This will result in rapid ageing. Given rather small migration rates at ages above 45, projected trends in ageing migrants are more reliable than for total migrant populations that experience large flows with frequently changing direction at working ages. Nevertheless, the size and mostly the direction of flows at older ages can bring some uncertainty. Return migration rates have the largest impact. But, immigration rates, although small, usually vary according to sex. There are also large differences in the size and sex distribution of flows by country of origin. However, changes in migration rates at older ages in the near future are likely to be small and slow. Death rates are much smaller than migration rates at ages below 70 or 75 when migration is still sizable. At older-old ages, death rates become more important than migration.

Projections for France are based on the 2008 census and use the component method<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Projections for England and Wales (Lievesley 2010) that will be used for comparison also use the component method.

Census data by sex, age and country of birth<sup>2</sup> are the baseline data. We project the population 65 years old and over to 2028 from the population aged 45 and over in 2008. We did not project migration on a longer horizon because it would include mid-adult ages in the first decades of the projection exercise and migration projections of working age adults can be affected by high uncertainty, following economic crisis or booms. We calculated migration rates at ages 45 and over in 2006-2008. Return migration rates are projected to decline from 2018, following decline in the proportions of lone males who return more than those in couples. A smaller decline has been projected for female return migration as to account for more back and forth moves of couples that result in shorter period of stay in host country (Rallu 2013).

From our projections of older migrants, we can estimate trends in elderly population, but we cannot estimate the proportion of elderly migrants in 2018 or 2028 as the total migrant population has not been projected. These indicators would be strongly affected by hypothesis on migration rates at young ages.

#### *Mortality estimates*<sup>3</sup>

Survival rates used in the projection are national averages, because survival rates by origin are not available for France. Using national averages reduces immigration rates and increases emigration rates, if survival rates of ethnic minority population are smaller than national average, and vice versa if they are higher. Hard work conditions, like those experienced by most migrants, are usually associated with high mortality. However, due to selection of migrants and returns to homeland of migrants in final medical condition, some studies show that migrants have higher 'in-country' survival rates than national average (Courbage et Khlat, 1995).

#### Migration estimates

Immigration statistics provide only immigrant figures; and numbers are often small at older  $ages^4$ . As France has no population file to record departures, censuses and surveys are the only sources of information on out-migration. Survey data could be affected by random variations due to sample size and selection bias. Moreover, surveys do not provide data on return migration. Therefore, we estimated migration at ages above 65 from censuses. Net migration is the difference between the 2006 population projected to survive to 2008 and the enumerated population in  $2008^5$  - this is sometimes called the expected population method.

It is also interesting to separate net migration in in- and out-migration. This can be done using the information from the question on residence 5 years prior to census date (see box). However, estimates of in- and out-migration by this method can be affected by errors in reporting previous residence. Inaccuracies are obvious when  $EM_x$  is  $> 0^6$ . But, lesser errors are not easily visible. Positive out-migration rates have been set to 0. Hectic age patterns have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> French by birth born outside of France have not been included because most of them are former European colonists.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> We did not do fertility estimates as we project only the population at ages above 65 years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Green and al. (2009) provide interesting information on older migrant flows to England and Wales, but these data are not comparable with the migration rates by age/cohorts presented in this paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> We assume the completeness of 2006 and 2008 censuses is similar. If this is not the case, migration estimates are affected by the different quality of enumerations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> 'Other African' males show very unreliable figures before age 60 (fig. 3).

been smoothed or replaced by averages of neighbouring countries. Then, immigration rates have been adjusted that net migration remains unchanged.

### Net migration, immigration and emigration rates

All calculations are done by birth cohorts.

Net migration rates (M) are estimated by the expected population method:

$$\begin{split} M_{2006\text{-}2008,x,x+n} &= P_{2008,x+n} \: / \: P_{2006,x} * \: S_{x,x+n} \\ \text{With}: \: P = \text{enumerated population;} \: x = age \text{ ; } n = 2008 \text{ - } 2006 = 2; \end{split}$$

**In-migration rates (IM)** in 2006-2008 are calculated as a fraction<sup>a</sup> of the number of arrivals in the 5-years-period before 2008, as reported in the question on residence five year before census date:

 $arrivals_{2006\text{-}2008,x}=0.44$  \* arrivals in the five years prior to 2008  $IM_{2006\text{-}2008,x,x+n}=arrivals_{2006\text{-}2008,x,x+n}$  /  $P_{2006,x}$ 

Then, out-migration rates (OM) are estimated as:

 $OM_{2006\text{--}2008,x,x+n} = (P_{2008,x+n} - arrivals_{2006\text{--}2008,x,x+n}) \ / \ P_{2006,x} \ * \ S_{x,x+n}$ 

Single-age rates calculated for 2006-2008 have been averaged for 5-year age-groups.

a) We used INSEE recommendations. For the two-year period before census, INSEE uses 0.44 instead of 0.40 to account for survival and departures of those who entered at the beginning of the 5 year period.

## 4.- Data

#### 4.1.- Age-structures in 2008

Age-pyramids of migrants are very different according to countries of origin of migrants in France and in England and Wales as well. They mostly reflect the history of migration from the various countries of origin. In France, the most ancient migratory flows are from Italia and Spain, starting before WW2, and Portugal<sup>7</sup>. Italian and Spanish migrants are old populations due to little recent flows from these countries, unlike Portugal. Among non-EU migrants, Europeans and Northern Africans, mostly Algerians and Tunisians, show already old population structures, with significant numbers of migrants in their 60s and 70s (figure 1). It is also the case for Black-Caribbean, Bangladeshi and secondarily for Pakistani in England and Wales (figure 2). The more recent migration flows: 'other African'<sup>8</sup>, Turks and 'other countries'<sup>9</sup> in France show much smaller numbers of migrants at ages above 60 years. Similar shapes of the age-pyramids are observed for Chinese and for 'other-Blacks', in England and Wales.

The proportions of migrants above age 65 translate these important differences in age structures. More than half of Italian and Spanish migrants were older than 65 years in 2008,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The public census data file provides only four national categories for EU member states: Italia, Portugal, Spain and 'others'. There was also significant migration from Poland in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, but data are not available separately from 'other EU countries'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Mostly Sub-Saharan Africans.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Mostly Asians.

followed by other EU migrants, due to ancient flows, like Poles. The oldest non-EU migrants: Europeans, Algerians and Tunisians show 15% or more population older than 65 years, against around 5% for recent migrants: 'other Africans', Turks and migrants from 'other countries' (table 4). In England and Wales, Black Caribbean, 'White others' and Indians show respectively 13%, 9% and 7% of population above 65 years while most others show figures below 5%. Thus, levels of ageing vary in rather similar ranges in both countries as regards non-EU migrants, but they are higher for Southern European migrants.

Table 4: Proportion (percent) of migrants 65 years-old and above by country of origin	, France
2008, England and Wales 2007.	

France	France (country of birth)												
Italia	Portugal	Spain	'other EU'	Non-EU Europa	Algeria	Moroc	o Tunisi	a other At	frica	Tur	key	Other country	
53,2	14,3	44,9	22,4	14,7	17,8	10	,3 15,	9	3,8		5,1	7,2	
England	England and Wales (ethnic origin)												
												White	
												others	
				oth	er B	lack	Black	other				(incl	
Pakist	ani Ind	ians	Bangladesl	ni Asia	an Afr	ican	Caribbean	Blacks	Ch	hinese	Other	EU)	
	4,7	7,3	4,	,3 5	,5	2,7	13,4	3,3		4,3	3,1	8,8	

A closer look at the pyramids from age 40 years shows the potential for ageing in the next 20 to 25 years. In France, all the age-pyramids of migrants, except for Italians, Spanish, 'other Africa' and 'other countries', show a surprising indentation at ages 45-54, up to 55-59 for Algerians. This is the result of the closed border policy following the 1974 oil-shock. Workers migration came nearly to a halt for a decade or more. Young adults from North Africa and non-EU European countries arriving at working ages - which are also the main migration ages - had more difficulty to migrate to France. Therefore, these male cohorts are depleted. Later, some males entered at older ages and in smaller numbers than their elders who could migrate younger and with less restriction, or used other channels, like undocumented migration, during the closed border period -. The closed border policy period saw also the development of family reunification schemes. Thus, larger numbers of females entered during the 1970s than before and there is no indentation on female age-pyramids.

A similar indentation is seen on the age-pyramid of Black-Caribbean in England and Wales. But it appears at older ages (55-64) than in France, and it is similar for males and females. Bangladeshi males, at ages 55-64, and to a lesser extent Pakistani and Indian males, at ages 60-64, show indentations. This is due to earlier economic crisis and restrictive migration policies in England and Wales, from 1960, than in France. The timing of decolonization and changes in migration policies for natives of former colonies also play a role.

Thus, migrant ageing varies greatly by origins according to migration histories, with also a role of policies. We can attempt to generalize and say that the speed and importance of overall migrant ageing in receiving countries will be related to the history and size of the various components of immigration flows and to the policies enacted by the countries.



## Figure 1: Age-pyramids of migrants by origin, France, 2008 census.



Figure 2: Age-pyramids of migrants by origin, England and Wales, 2007.





### 4.2.- Migration flows at older ages

In France, emigration rates<sup>10</sup> tend to increase from age 50-54 to 65-69<sup>11</sup>, mostly for males (figure 3). At ages 60-64 and 65-69, that are retirement ages, males' emigration rates are mainly in the range of 1.1% to 2% per year - or 5.5% to 10% over five years -, and somewhat higher for Turks and non-EU Europeans. The main component of these flows is return migration of workers after retirement. Rates are lower for females, mostly below 5%, and they do not show as steep increases with age as for males. Older female migrants were less frequently workers than males. But the main reason of these gender differences is probably<sup>12</sup> that males are more likely to return to their country of origin if they are alone, while couples are less likely to return. Thus, male emigration rates are higher than for females, because males are more often alone than females, mostly among older African and Turk. However, the proportion of lone male workers will decline in the future due to increases in family reunification and family migration from the mid 1970s. Among 60-64 years-old males in employment, 30% of the Algeria-born and Sub-Saharan Africa-born, and 17% of the Turkeyborn were living alone, against 15%, 25% and 10% respectively among the 50-54 years-old. Lone workers were less frequent among Moroccans (17%), Tunisians (24%) and migrants from 'other countries' (18%) and declines in younger cohorts are by 3 to 5 percentage points. Thus, the gap between male and female return migration rates is partly structurally related to household situation. Therefore, we made assumptions that male emigration rates will decline by 15% in 2018-2023 and by 40% to 2023-2028, for Africans and Turks and by 10% and 20% for other origins and for all females. Actually, it is likely that retired migrants will more and more move back and forth between France and their countries of origin. Comparatively to stable rates, this assumption increases the numbers of older migrants by 2% or less in 2028, showing that age structures (cohort sizes) are the main component of trends in ageing.

It is also difficult to explain differences in level of return migration by country of origin from census data only. The proximity factor is certainly important. But it can play in different directions: migrants from neighbouring countries can chose to return or to stay, depending on their financial capacity and their interest in moving back and forth. Other factors are certainly related to the family situation of migrants and the number of kin in-country. Some important

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Italians and Spanish show nearly nil both in- and out-migration. Errors in reporting previous residence for Portuguese and other EU migrants result in unreliable estimates of in- and out-migration. Net migration rates were projected for these populations. Portuguese show net migration of 1% yearly until age 54, followed by rates of -2.0% to -2.5% until age 70. 'Other EU' migrants show net migration by 4% to 5% yearly from age 40 to 70. Rates for females are about half those for males.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Out-migration rates are very small at ages 45-49 and they are not shown.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Survey data would be necessary to assess the patterns of return migration after retirement by sex, work histories and family situation.

differences appear between males and females of same origin. Usually, females emigrate less than males, with female emigration being very small for non-EU European before ages 65-69 whereas males of the same origin show the highest return rates. On the opposite, females from 'other countries' emigrate more frequently than males.

Figure 3: five-year out-migration rates (unsmoothed<sup>a</sup>) for 50-69 years-old birth cohorts by sex and origin, France, 2006-2008.



a) and not corrected for errors, therefore rates can be < 0

In-migration rates of older migrants are most often much smaller than out-migration rates. They also vary much more than out-migration rates according to origin of migrants. Five-year in-migration rates of older male migrants are still sizable (above 5%) for non-EU Europeans and just below 5% for 'other countries' (figure 4). They are much lower: around 2%, for 'other Africans' and often below 1% for North African and Turks. In-migration of females is also significant for non-EU Europeans, 'other countries' and 'other African' - for the latter, rates are much higher than for males. Rates are lower for females from other origins, but they are significantly higher than for males, with rates around 2% against below 1%. That is probably due to family reunification (see above). Inflows of non EU Europeans and from 'other countries' are more balanced by sex, probably in the frame of migration of couples of retirees.

Figure 4: five-year in-migration rates (unsmoothed) for 50-69 years-old birth cohorts by sex and origin, France, 2006-2008.



For males, net migration is positive at ages 45-59 for Algerians and 'other African' and up to age 64 for 'other countries'. But it is negative for all other origins from age 50, and even from age 45 for non-EU Europeans, Tunisians and Turks.

Net migration is most often positive for females. Thus, female migrant populations are still building up at ages between 50 and 60 years, mostly for non-EU Europeans, 'other Africans' and 'other countries', and up to age 65 for the former two. At ages where it is positive for both sexes, female net migration is always higher than for males.

## **5.- Results**

## 5.1.- Trends in older migrant populations

Below, we comment trends in numbers of older migrants to 2016 and 2026 in England and Wales and to 2018 and 2028 in France<sup>13</sup>.

ages 05	iges 05 years and over, 2008 – 100											
				'other	non-EU			'other		'other		
	Italia	Portugal	Spain	EU'	Europa	Algeria	Morocco	Africa'	Turks	countries'	total	
2018	86	180	89	145	135	132	195	249	231	185	138	
2028	63	227	79	206	162	147	273	583	353	352	179	

Table 5: Projected trends in older migrant populations by origin, France ages 65 years and over 2008 - 100

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Results presented here are those of scenario B of 'Projections of Ageing Migrant populations in France: 2008-2028', presented at the Joint Eurostat/UNECE Work Session on Demographic Projections, organised in cooperation with Istat, Rome, 29-31 October 2013 (Rallu 2013). Scenario B is the most realistic of those computed for the Joint Work Session.

<u>uges o</u> :	years a	14 0 101,	2007 = 10	0.						
				other	Black	Black	other			White
	Pakistani	Indians	Bangladeshi	Asian	African	Caribbean	Blacks	Chinese	Other	others
2016	121	139	106	170	199	87	115	155	268	127
2026	233	242	196	315	592	131	256	403	573	198
C	T ' 1	0010 * 0								

Table 6: Projected trends in older ethnic minority populations, England and Wales, ages 65 years and over, 2007\* = 100.

Source : Lievesley 2010 ; \* 2007 ONS estimates.

*Figure 5: Projected trends in older migrant populations by origin, scenario B, France, ages 65 years and over, 2008 = 100* 



Except for older migrants: Italians and Spanish who are declining populations, tremendous increases in elderly migrant populations will occur in the future, as expected from the large cohorts arriving at ages 65 years and over. However, in the next 10 to 15 years, increases in the numbers of 65 years-old migrants will be tempered by the indentations seen on the age-pyramids following the restrictive workers migration policies from 1975 in France. Older non-EU Europeans and Algerians, the most affected by the closed border policy, will increase by a little more than 30% to 2018 and by around 50% to 2028 (table 5 and figure 5). This is still rapid change, but less than for Portuguese and other EU migrants who entered freely after they joined the EU, erasing the effect of the closed border policy. A similar phenomenon appears for Moroccans who migrated, often undocumented, until late adult ages in the 1980s and in the 1990s. Their numbers will nearly double by 2018 and increase 2.7 folds to 2028. The number of 'other Africans' will more than double to 2018 and increase nearly 6 folds to 2028. Increases will also be important for Turks and migrants from 'other countries'.

In England and Wales, increases to 2016 will be moderate, with 20% or less for Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and 'other Black', and even a decline for 'Black Caribbean' (table 6). However, increases to 2026 will be faster and finally overall increase will be two folds, except for 'Black Caribbean'. 'Black Africans' will increase at the fastest rate and rather at the same rate as in France: nearly 6 folds. Increases in 'other' – from 2006 - and in Chinese - after 2016 - will also be important.

<u>uges 75</u>	yours c													
				'other	non-EU			'other		'other				
	Italia	Portugal	Spain	EU'	Europa	Algeria	Morocco	Africa'	Turks	countries'	total			
2018	87	230	98	108	123	178	237	235	174	143	129			
2028	69	396	79	174	179	226	457	604	454	278	182			

Table 7: Projected trends in older migrant populations by origin, France ages 75 years and over, 2008 = 100

In France, increases in the number of migrants 75 years-old and over to 2018 will be slower than at 65 years and over, except for Portuguese, Spanish, Algerians and Moroccans (table 7). But, they will be faster for all migrant origins, except Portuguese between 2018 and 2028. However, we shall witness important differences in the pace of ageing by origin. These varied trends are mostly the result of the different sizes of the cohort arriving at ages 65 and over and 75 and over. It reflects migrants' ages at arrival and variations in the timing and intensity of migration in the past. Some of these variations are rather random variations for the smallest migrant communities in the past.

Table 8: Projected trends of the oldest old migrants by origin, France ages 85 years and over 2008 = 100

až	iges 65 years and over, 2000 = 100												
					'other	non-EU			'other		'other		
		Italia	Portugal	Spain	EU'	Europa	Algeria	Morocco	Africa'	Turks	countries'	Total	
	2018	121	329	135	99	105	251	276	193	90	159	141	
	2028	91	712	114	113	136	416	630	459	194	219	176	

For the oldest old migrants, trends are mostly due to the various sizes of the age-groups already in-country in 2008, as migration rates are very small at older ages. The number of Italians at ages 85 and over will still increase by 20% to 2018 before declining by 10% - relative to 2008 - in 2028. Oldest-old Spanish will increase by 35% to 2018 and by 14% to 2028 – actually declining from 2018. Moroccans, 'other Africans' and Algerians will see the most rapid increases to 2018 and 2028 (table 8). The numbers of oldest old will double for Turks<sup>14</sup> and for migrants from 'other countries' to 2028. Non-EU Europeans show slow increase.

## 5.2.- Trends by sex

Projections show very different trends for males and females in France<sup>15</sup>. For all migrants' origins, the increase is faster for females than for males, except for 'other EU'<sup>16</sup> and 'other countries' (table 9 and figure 6). This is due to declining male cohorts during the close border policy after 1975 whereas females show always increasing cohorts. Moreover, female migrants have recently experienced lower return migration and higher immigration than males. Thus, while the increase to 2018 is very small (12%) for Algerian males 65 years-old and over, with even a decline between 2018 and 2028 - resulting in stable numbers over the 2008-2028 period, the number of Algerian females will double by 2028. A rather similar pattern is seen for non-EU Europeans. Between 2008 and 2028, the number of Moroccan older female migrants will increase more than twice faster than for males, with an index of 431 against 181. Increases will also be much faster for Turk and 'other African' females than for males, with the latter seeing the fastest increase, their number being multiplied 7 folds. Sex differentials are moderate for migrants from 'other countries', with males increasing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> For Turks, the decline in 2018 results from the erratic shape of their age-pyramid at older ages, due to small numbers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Figures by sex are not available in the Report for England and Wales.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> This is mostly due to higher migration of males.

slightly faster than females. – This is due to smaller numbers of elderly males than females in 2008 and subsequently similar cohort size arriving at ages above 65 for both sexes, resulting in higher relative increase for males; higher emigration of females than males has also some impact.

uges os	years and											
	2018	2028	2018	2028	2018	2028	2018	2028	2018	2028		
	Italia		Portugal		Spain		EU'		non EU	Europa		
total	86	63	180	227	89	79	145	206	135	162		
М	87	65	174	210	87	79	163	251	124	123		
F	84	61	186	243	91	79	133	176	144	192		
	Algeria		Morocco		'other Afri	ca'	Turks		'other co	untries'		
total	132	147	195	273	249	588	231	353	185	354		
М	112	102	177	184	250	497	216	291	197	379		
F	169	227	228	433	248	715	248	424	175	334		

Table 9: Projected trends in older migrant populations by sex and origin, France, ages 65 years and over, 2008 = 100

*Figure 6: Projected trends in older migrant populations by sex for selected origins, scenario B, France, ages 65 years and over, 2008 = 100* 



## 5.3.- Sex ratios of older migrant populations

In France, 55 to 75 years-old migrants from Northern and 'other Africa', and secondarily Turkey, still exhibited high sex ratios in 2008, with between 150 and 200 males per 100 females (figure 7). The early waves of labour migrants are still often lone males because their nuptiality was disrupted by migration, and many of those who are married have not brought their wives to France, because of their precarious economic condition.

Figure 7: Sex ratios of migrants in France, 2008 census.



Sex differentials in migration<sup>17</sup>: higher emigration rates for males than for females and higher immigration rates for the latter will have significant impact on sex ratios of older migrant populations.

The sex ratio of migrants is affected by specific factors in relation with male and female migration in the frame of family reunification. A man has to be alive to bring his wife under family reunification, which, in a way, erases the effect of male excess mortality and is associated with higher than expected sex ratios of older migrants<sup>18</sup>. Widowed women can also enter through family reunification. But, they need to fulfil at least 2 conditions: 1) have a migrant child living in-country and 2) be eligible for family reunification which is more restrictive for mothers than for wives.



Figure 8: Projected trends in sex ratios of migrants in France.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Combined with higher death rates of males than of females.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> In non-migrant populations, men die (on average) before their wives and sex ratios decline steeply at old ages.

Due to more balanced sex ratios of younger migrant cohorts and to higher immigration of females than males, the sex ratios of African migrants will decline from 140 males per 100 females or higher in 2008 to between 80 to 100 males for 100 females in 2028, with nearly balanced numbers of males and females for Tunisians and 'other Africans' and male deficits for Algerians, Moroccans and Turks. However, these levels are still above national average of 71.5 males for 100 females of similar ages, because the effect of male excess mortality is compensated for by sex structures specific to migrant populations: high sex ratios of migrant cohorts at arrival – and still in 2008-, and because males have to be alive to allow their wives to enter through family reunification.

For non-EU Europeans, higher emigration of males than of females increases sex imbalances with a projected sex ratio of 50 males for 100 females in 2028. On the opposite, female migrants from 'other countries' leave more than males and the sex ratio of this population is projected to increase to 90 by 2028, tending to rebalance the numbers of males and females. 'Other EU' migrants' will experience similar trends due to the higher sex ratios of cohorts arriving at ages 65 years and above, and higher male than female net migration.

## Conclusion

Age-pyramids of migrants by country of origin show very different shapes that translate the history of migration flows to receiving countries. The date of the onset of migration, pre- and post-independence migration, the size of flows and their pace of increase, as well as migration policies of host countries can be read on the age-pyramids of migrants and will determine future ageing. On the long-term, migration has been almost constantly increasing and migrant ageing will be very fast in the next decades. However, policies like the closed border policy in France will slow migrant ageing in the next 10 to 15 years. Then, larger migrant cohorts will result in a rapid boom of older migrants whose numbers will increase two to three folds over the next twenty years for most origins, except non-EU Europeans and Algerians in France, and Black Caribbean in England and Wales. Black Africans will show the fastest ageing, the numbers of older migrants increasing 6 folds to 2028 in both France and England and Wales.

Although relatively small, old-age migration will have impacts on trends in migrant ageing. Return migration is the main component of migration for older males, but immigration is sometimes significant for females, due to family reunification and arrivals of the '0 generation'. In France, these flows tend to rebalance the sex ratios of migrants, mostly from Africa and other labour sending countries.

Both English and French data show varied patterns of migrant ageing by origin. Thus, at the level of host countries, the speed and intensity of migrant ageing will be determined by the history of migration by origin and the relative size of these flows. Host country policy changes will also have an impact on the timing and speed of migrant ageing. This implies to use data by origin for international comparisons so that the different situations, the speed of migrant ageing and its variations are well understood. Origin is also important for health and social services that deal with linguistically diverse populations.

In the above projections, the mobility approach has been limited to international migration. The economic status has also a role on old-age migration. Poor migrants have certainly reduced mobility whereas the better-off can choose bi-residence in host and origin countries. The future will likely see more back and forth moves of elderly migrants.

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