

How do women with a partner respond to activation policies? Household roles and employment effects of training and workfare in Germany

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A major unemployment and welfare benefit reform took place in Germany in 2005. One objective of this reform was to more strongly encourage an adult worker model of the family for means-tested unemployment benefit recipients and to activate the formerly inactive. Much emphasis has since been given to assignments to active labor market programs. Our research question refers to the extent to which women in households with a formerly traditional division of labor actually can improve their chances of employment by participating in active labor market programs, thus potentially changing role allocations in the household. Our focus is on short training programs as well as workfare. For our analyses, we develop household types on the basis of women's and their partner's previous employment experience and earnings. Accordingly, we differentiate between former male breadwinner households, female breadwinner households, dual earner households, as well as no earner households. Effects of active labor market programs are then compared between women in these different household types. We analyze large-scale administrative data, applying a timing-of-events approach. This allows controlling for selectivity in program entries. We find that program participations are particularly selective for women in former male breadwinner and no earner households. Nonetheless, even when accounting for selectivity in program entries, effects on entering employment are still considerably larger for women in former male breadwinner and no earner households than for women in former dual earner and female breadwinner households.

1. Introduction

Our article investigates whether employment effects of active labor market programs (ALMPs) differ for women depending on their prior household role. In Germany, a major unemployment and welfare benefit reform took place in 2005. One of the goals of the reform was to encourage persons previously not participating in the labor market to seek employment. In households receiving means-tested unemployment benefits, all household members are expected to contribute to reducing the household's benefit dependency, even those who previously were not employed. ALMPs, such as workfare or training programs, are intended to assist welfare benefit recipients in finding employment. Requirements to participate in such ALMPs regardless of prior labor force participation have been described as interfering in household members' private decisions concerning their division of labor. On the other hand, access to ALMPs even for persons who have previously had no or only very little contact to the labor market can also be seen as opening new opportunities for them. The research question in our paper is whether ALMPs actually do have employment effects even for women who previously had very little or no earnings from employment, particularly when they relied on their partner to provide for the household's income.

From a theoretical perspective, ALMP effects should actually be expected to be particularly large for these groups of women. In the international literature, stronger ALMP effects have very often been found for women than for men. Explanations for women's ALMP effect premia tend to make assumptions about the household context, without explicitly taking it into account. It has been argued that ALMP effects should be larger for women since women often have alternative options open to them, such as running the household or caring for children (Bergemann and van den Berg, 2008). For this reason, their labor supply should be more responsive to wage changes induced by ALMP participation. The implicit assumption here is that women can rely on a partner to provide for the household's economic needs. This article for the first time differentiates women by their prior division of labor in the household when evaluating ALMP effects, in order to take the household context explicitly into account. We focus on recipients of means-tested unemployment benefits, who compose the majority of the unemployed in Germany. The household context should be particularly important for means-tested benefit recipients, as the whole household needs to pass the means-test in order to be eligible for the benefit. In our theoretical considerations section, we discuss the implications of the special situation of

means-tested benefit recipients for expected differences in ALMP effects according to the prior division of labor in the household.

In our empirical analyses, we focus on effects of the two largest active labor market programs for means-tested benefit recipients during our study period: short-term classroom training and workfare programs, called One-Euro-Jobs. The data we use is administrative data, which gives us the opportunity to analyze very large sample sizes. Our sample consists of women who were living with a partner and who entered into a state of non-employment and means-tested unemployment benefit receipt at any time between October 2005 and December 2007. We subdivide our sample according to each partner's prior earnings, such that we can compare former *male breadwinner, no earner, female breadwinner*, and *dual earner* households. For the evaluation of effects of classroom training and workfare programs, we apply a timing-of-events approach. Therefore, we are able to account for selectivity in program entries, which may be particularly important in the case of women with little previous employment experience.

In the next section, we discuss the institutional framework given by the means-tested unemployment benefit and unemployment insurance systems in Germany. We especially focus on the increased importance of ALMPs for means-tested benefit recipients since the Hartz IV welfare and employment policy reform in 2005. We then summarize previous international findings on ALMP effects for women, as well as findings specifically for Germany. Following this, we develop our research questions and hypotheses in the theoretical considerations section. In section 5, we discuss our data and method of analysis. We present our empirical results in section 6, and draw together and discuss the most important implications of our findings in the conclusion.

2. Institutional background

Important and large-scale labor market reforms were introduced in Germany from 2002 to 2005 in order to reduce the level of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment. The most far-reaching reforms came into force in 2005 ("Hartz IV") and merged the former unemployment assistance for the long-term unemployed and the former social assistance to create the new Unemployment Benefit (UB) II (Eichhorst *et al.*, 2010). The new welfare benefit UB II is means-tested and consists of a flat-rate base benefit that is currently 391 Euro

(as of January 2014); additionally, costs of housing and heating are covered (Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2005).

An important goal of the reform was the activation of people who were formerly not active on the labor market. Unemployed persons now have to search for a job more quickly than before. Not only is UB II a comparatively low-level benefit, but it is also connected to quite intensive activity requirements. Welfare benefit recipients have to accept any type of legal job offer, and they can be sanctioned by temporary benefit cuts for not complying (Wolff and Moczall, 2012). They are also required to participate in ALMPs, if assigned by their case managers.

Different types of ALMPs are available to UB II recipients, e.g., qualification measures and programs to improve job integration opportunities, employment promotion measures or instruments promoting self-employment, as well as public employment or workfare programs. Our paper aims to investigate the effects of the two largest ALMPs, workfare and short-term classroom training programs.

With the “Hartz IV” reform in 2005, workfare programs, the so-called One-Euro-Jobs, were introduced. In the first years after its introduction, this was a large-scale program: it was the program with the most participants. One-Euro-Jobs are a public employment scheme and have several aims: They are intended to increase the employability of long-term unemployed people and therefore enhance their chances of finding regular employment. Moreover, they aim at the social integration of participants, and they are also used by the case-managers as a means of testing an unemployed person’s willingness to work (Hohmeyer and Wolff, 2012). Jobs carried out as One-Euro-Jobs have to be additional, of public interest, and subordinate to regular employment, vocational training and other ALMPs. Participants receive a small allowance of usually 1 to 1.50 € per hour worked in addition to their UB II. The duration of participation is typically up to six months.

Short-term training programs are also a popular program that is widely used. The overall aim is to help unemployed people to reintegrate into the regular labor market. This program is a heterogeneous instrument and covers, e.g., skill training, aptitude tests, and application training (Kopf, 2013). Moreover, it can take place either in classrooms or within firms as short internships. We only concentrate on classroom training programs here, in which women participated much more frequently than in firm-based programs. The duration of classroom training is from a few days up to twelve weeks. During participation, participants continue their UB II receipt and do not receive any additional wage. Program costs, travel expenses and costs for child care are covered.

While participating in a short-term training programs or One-Euro-Jobs, participants are still registered as job-seekers, though they are no longer registered as unemployed.

3. ALMP effects for women

Numerous articles evaluate the effects of ALMPs for men and women separately. As pointed out by Bergemann and van den Berg (2008) in a survey of the international literature on ALMP effects for women, many studies find effect premia for women for various types of ALMPs. Bergemann and van den Berg (2008) give different theoretical explanations for this: a more elastic labor supply of women, as women have more alternatives and options, a larger responsiveness to wage changes, and an often greater distance to the labor market where women may underestimate their own opportunities. They note that ALMP participation increases female labor market opportunities and wages and may increase women's eagerness to become employed. They point out that these explanations should hold especially in labor markets with low female labor market participation.

Lechner and Wiehler (2011) evaluate reasons for the effect differences for men and women with Austrian administrative data. They analyze pregnancies among female participants and non-participants and detect lower fertility among ALMP participants. Therefore, they explain greater effects on female employment in Austria with higher shares of women leaving the workforce among non-participants. With their paper they pick up one explanation from Bergemann and van den Berg (2008) and test the 'more options' thesis for women.

As discussed in the previous section, in this paper, we focus specifically on One-Euro-Jobs and short-term classroom training programs for women receiving UB II in Germany. In the following, we summarize previous findings on employment effects of these two ALMPs, as well as respective gender differences, if existent, in Germany.

Hohmeyer and Wolff (2012) and Hohmeyer (2012) analyze the effects of workfare programs for welfare recipients in Germany with administrative data and propensity score matching methods. They report initial lock-in effects for all groups of participants on the regular employment rate. Participants tend to reduce their job search effort while enrolled in the program, which results in lower employment rates than for non-participants in the short-term. Nevertheless afterwards, there are small significant positive effects for women in

Eastern and Western Germany (one and three percentage points) on the regular employment rate. Men have much longer lock-in effects. These effects approach zero after 20 months.

Other studies do not find significant effect differences between men and women, but the observation periods in these studies are too short for effect differences in the medium- and long-term to become evident. Huber *et al.* (2010) use survey data and matching methods. They detect negative lock-in effects of One-Euro-Jobs and regular employment and hardly find any effect heterogeneity between men and women. However, they only measure relatively short effects with a maximum of 17 months (depending on the month of program start) and their subsamples become very small when doing heterogeneity analysis. Thomsen and Walter (2010) use administrative data and propensity score matching and find strong lock-in effects for men and women on the regular employment rate. They find no effect premia for women. However, they only analyze effects over very short period of up to 12 months after program start where others also still find lock-in effects. A longer-term evaluation of workfare programs seems to be crucial to learn more about effects as well as effect heterogeneity.

Turning to classroom training programs, there are no clear effect premia for women in the German evaluation literature. Short-term classroom training is an especially short program where effects may not be substantial enough for the group of UB II recipients who on average have little labor market experience. Wolff and Jozwiak (2007) even find slightly smaller effects for women than for men. They evaluate classroom training programs for welfare recipients with administrative data and matching methods. Moreover, the authors differentiate for different family contexts, with and without a partner and/or children. The effects are higher for Eastern German women without a partner and children and for women with a partner and children, but not for childless women with a partner or lone mothers. In Western Germany, effects for women are highest for childless women with a partner. These results indicate that the household context does play a role for the effectivity of a program.

Kopf (2013) analyzes different short-term training programs for welfare recipients with administrative data and propensity score matching. She finds small effect premia for Eastern German women concerning effects on the employment stability, but slightly smaller effects for Western German women.

Huber *et al.* (2010) use survey data and matching methods. They find positive effects of short-term training on the regular employment rate. The effect differences between men and women are not significant, and they do not differentiate between classroom and in-firm training.

There are other studies in Germany that use older data and analyze effects for unemployment insurance (UI) recipients and not for welfare recipients. Biewen *et al.* (2007) use administrative data and matching methods and find larger effects for women than for men. Osikonimu (2013) also uses administrative data and a dynamic matching approach. She, on the other hand, detects moderate positive effects of short-term training on job stability, but no consistent gender differences. Hujer *et al.* (2006) use administrative data and multivariate mixed proportional hazard models. They find positive effects for men and women, but no female effect premia.

Thus, although many international studies find effect premia of ALMPs for women as pointed out by Bergemann and van den Berg (2008), the findings for Germany are mixed for these two programs. Potential explanations are that the observation windows used in the evaluations are too short, and that effects of very short programs such as classroom training are quite small overall. Nonetheless, the general theoretical argumentation by (Bergemann and van den Berg, 2008) that alternative non-labor market options for women could lead to greater ALMP effects than for men does seem convincing. If women have options outside the labor market, they may be more responsive to wage changes induced by participating in ALMPs. This line of argumentation may not be completely applicable to UB II recipients in Germany, however. Most women receiving UB II may simply not have good alternative options to employment, since their partners' economic resources are very low as well. We return to this point when exploring the possible implications of previous household roles for ALMP effects for women receiving UB II in Germany in the next section.

4. Theoretical considerations

In this paper, we are looking into the importance of the household context for women's ALMP effects. In general, ALMPs can increase participants' chances of employment through different channels, such as increased human capital, information for the unemployed and employers, or reduced costs (Bernhard *et al.*, 2009). We thus generally expect to find positive effects of ALMP participation on employment entries for women. Nevertheless, for longer programs, such as One-Euro-Jobs, we also expect to find lock-in effects for the duration of enrolment in the program because participants have less time to search for jobs than non-participants (Hohmeyer, 2012). For short classroom training programs, which run for a

duration of only a few days to twelve weeks as described above, we do not expect lock-in effects to become evident in our results.

As described above, the empirical evaluation literature has very often found greater ALMP effects for women than for men. A number of theoretical considerations have been brought forward specifically to explain this effect premium for women. These generally focus on women with a partner and often make explicit or implicit assumptions about women's role in the household. So far though, no ALMP evaluation studies have actually differentiated women by their household role. This study fills this gap in order to gain further insight as to the validity of some of the major explanations for women's effect premium.

Many of the explanations for stronger ALMP effects for women also seem to have women receiving UI in mind, not those receiving the flat-rate means-tested UB II. A larger proportion of the unemployed in Germany however actually receive means-tested benefits than unemployment insurance (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2014) and it is important to take their specific situation into account. The household context is likely to play a different role for women's ALMP effects in the case of women whose whole household is dependent on means-tested benefits than for those who are receiving individual-level insurance-based unemployment benefits.

We will begin by reviewing explanations for women's effect premium made in previous research, upon which basis we will develop our research questions.

In our empirical analyses, we will then look at women in different household constellations and detect whether ALMP effects differ for women in former male breadwinner, female breadwinner, dual breadwinner and no breadwinner households. We describe the operationalization of the former division of labor in the household in more detail in the data and methods section. In a nutshell, we use an interaction between women's and their partner's cumulative earnings across the ten years prior to becoming unemployed benefit recipients¹.

Theories on ALMP effects for women in the literature

As indicated above, Bergemann and van den Berg (2008) focus on ALMP effects for women and provide theoretical explanations why there is effect heterogeneity on the basis of gender. Firstly, women face larger wage elasticities than men because alternatives to participating in

¹ We first calculate the common median over women's and their partners' individual cumulative earnings across the previous ten years. We then use this median to label women and their partners as having low or high prior individual earnings. Our household categories indicate whether both partners previously had low earnings (*no breadwinner* households), both had high earnings (*dual earner* households), or whether one partner had low and the other had high earnings (*male breadwinner* households and *female breadwinner* households).

the labor market, such as assuming the homemaker role or caring for children, are open to many women. Therefore, non-participants may retreat from the labor force. As described above, Lechner and Wiehler (2011) confirm this hypothesis and show that Austrian non-participants have significantly higher fertility rates than ALMP participants. It may however be too simplistic to indiscriminately apply these considerations to all women. Hakim (2000) calls attention to variations in attitudes and preferences among women. She states that of three ideal types (home-centred, adaptive, work-centred) only adaptive women really have such higher wage elasticities. According to Hakim (2000), a majority of women nevertheless is adaptive (around 60%), only minorities are home- or work-centred. It is in any case an important point that the exchangeability of labor market and homework cannot be taken as a given for all women. We return to this point from a different perspective below, emphasizing the role of households' economic resources for women's options.

Second, many women have higher reservation wages than offered by the market. ALMPs can help them through human capital enhancement to achieve their reservation wages. Since women are relatively well educated in Germany (Caliendo and Künn, 2012), on this basis, even small-scale programs can help them to achieve a higher earnings potential (Bergemann and van den Berg, 2008). Third, women on average have less labor market experience than men. They often have interrupted labor market histories due to, e.g., maternity leave or care responsibilities. Therefore, they may underestimate their opportunities and they are just not used to being employed. ALMPs may help women to learn more about the own opportunities.

Their lesser labor market experience may also lead to statistical discrimination of women. ALMPs may help employers to learn more about women's productivity.

Lower versus higher labor market experience of women

To begin with, the last point cited above made by Bergemann and van den Berg (2008) does appear very plausible. Women's lesser labor market experience may be a reason that they can profit more strongly from ALMPs. However, there is a large variety in the female labor force. Not all women have little employment experience.

Women in two of our household types (*male breadwinner* and *no breadwinner* households) have lower employment experience and prior earnings than women in the other two household types. Therefore, we raise the hypothesis that women from former *no earner*

or *male breadwinner* households will have higher ALMP effects than women from *female breadwinner* and *dual earner* households.

A further factor that may have been partially responsible for findings of differences in ALMP effects between women and men in previous studies is greater selectivity in women's ALMP participations (Hohmeyer and Kopf, 2009). In this paper, we apply a timing-of-events approach to account for selectivity in program participations. Unobserved factors such as greater motivation to find employment may influence both participations in ALMPs as well as the chance of finding a job. It is likely that ALMP participations are particularly selective for people with little employment experience. Taking part in ALMPs is a first step towards re-entering employment. For people with less work experience, finding employment is especially difficult and should require more effort and motivation than for those who already have extensive employment experience. Due to women's more frequent childcare-related employment breaks, they on average have less employment experience than men. In studies that do not control for selectivity in ALMP participations, greater selectivity in women's than men's ALMP participations could be part of the explanation for the ALMP effect bonus for women. As argued above though, not all women have little labor market experience. If selectivity is an issue, this should especially apply to women from *no breadwinner* and *male breadwinner* households. We expect to find selectivity in ALMP participations especially for these two groups. Even when controlling for selectivity though, we still expect to find greater ALMP effects for women with less employment experience (from *no breadwinner* and *male breadwinner* households) than for those with greater employment experience (from former *dual earner* and *female breadwinner* households), for the reasons delineated above.

No earner versus male breadwinner and female breadwinner versus dual earner households

In the previous section, we developed the hypothesis that women with low previous individual earnings will have stronger ALMP effects than women with comparatively high former individual earnings. In this section, we take a closer look at the role of the partner's former employment and earnings and further differentiate between women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households as well as between women from *female breadwinner* and *dual earner* households.

Next to their own labor market experience and earnings potential, their partner's resources and employment potential can be relevant for women's ALMP effects as well. The first explanation for women's greater ALMP effects by Bergemann and van den Berg (2008)

cited above is that women have greater wage elasticities due to alternative options outside the labor market. This explanation implicitly assumes that women can rely on a provider in the household, and can concentrate on non-market work instead, such as running the household or childcare. Of the different groups of women in our article, those from former *male breadwinner* and *dual earner* households should most closely correspond to the description of women with further non-labor market options in Bergemann and van den Berg (2008). All else equal, wage elasticities should therefore be greater for women from those two household types. To the extent that taking part in ALMPs raises potential wages, ALMP effects would be then expected to be larger for women from former *male breadwinner* compared to *no breadwinner* and from former *dual earner* compared to *female breadwinner* households.

However, our focus is on a special target group: recipients of means-tested welfare benefits. Therefore, for the sample we are looking at, it is not so certain that women can rely on their partner to secure the household's economic needs. The women in our sample are receiving UB II. This is a household-based benefit and only persons whose whole household passes the means-test are eligible for it. This means that their partners either have very low earnings, or are unemployed as well.

Thus, a plausible expectation for our sample might be that even those women who were not participating or had the option not to participate before will enter the labor market in light of their partners' limited employment options at present. This would correspond to what is referred to as an 'added worker effect' in the literature. Empirical evidence of the added worker effect has been mixed (Lundberg, 1985; Dex *et al.*, 1995). Some studies do report finding at least partial evidence of an added worker effect for Germany, while for the United Kingdom usually the opposite effect has been found (Giannelli and Micklewright, 1995; Bingley and Walker, 2001; McGinnity, 2002). The receipt of means-tested benefits has been identified as a disincentive towards women with low earnings potential entering the labor market, particularly when there is no or only a small earnings disregard. Since UB II is means-tested with only a very small earnings disregard, it is uncertain whether an added worker effect should be expected. On the other hand, the emphasis on activation has strongly increased since the Hartz IV reforms in 2005. All members of households receiving UB II are in principle required to seek employment and contribute to reducing the household's benefit dependency. If household members do not show up for appointments at the Job Center or refuse to take part in activation measures, they can be sanctioned via temporary benefit cuts. Therefore, women's employment can take a lot of pressure off of the household. This should lead to an added worker effect for women from households receiving UB II after all.

Thus, we do not think that alternative, non-labor market options are the key to understanding ALMP effects for women receiving UB II in Germany. While the theoretical considerations by (Bergemann and van den Berg, 2008) call attention to the importance of the household context, we believe that the partner's characteristics may affect women's ALMP effects via a different pathway.

As has been pointed out in the literature on coupled careers and jobless couples, when searching for a job, women can potentially profit from their partner's networks and knowledge about application strategies (Bernasco *et al.*, 1998; Bernardi, 1999; Härkönen, 2007; Liebig *et al.*, 2012). Women whose partners have little employment experience, on the other hand, cannot draw on such resources. Having access to ALMPs, such as training programs, which very often include job application courses, can therefore be especially important for women whose partner does not bring such skills into the household. Taking part in workfare programs could also serve as a means towards building networks useful for finding employment.

For these reasons, we would expect larger ALMP effects for those groups of women who cannot profit from their partners' resources and networks when searching for a job. That is, we would expect larger ALMP effects for women from former *no breadwinner* households than for those from former *male breadwinner* households, and larger ALMP effects for those from former *female breadwinner* than *dual earner* households.

Regional differences: Eastern vs. western Germany

In Eastern Germany, people's attitudes are more strongly in favor of female employment and egalitarian divisions of labor in the household than in Western Germany (Scheuer and Dittmann, 2007). Those women who had low cumulative earnings in recent years are less likely to have intentionally retreated from the labor market in Eastern Germany. In this part of Germany, they should already be likely to be actively searching for a job, and do not require ALMPs as an additional source of motivation. Overall, we expect less positive ALMP effects in Eastern than in Western Germany due to women's generally stronger labor market orientation in Eastern Germany (Sacher, 2005; Kreyenfeld and Geisler, 2006; Hanel and Riphahn, 2011; Schwengler *et al.*, 2011).

To summarize, our hypotheses are the following:

- 1) Overall, we expect to find positive effects of ALMP participation (after a short lock-in effect in the case of One-Euro-Jobs) on entries into employment for all of the groups of women in our study.
- 2) We expect women with lower prior cumulative earnings and presumably lower chances of employment to have more pronounced ALMP effects. Therefore, we anticipate higher effects for women in former *no breadwinner* and *male breadwinner* households compared to women in former *female breadwinner* and *dual breadwinner* households.
- 3) Selectivity in ALMP participations for women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households should be greater than for those from former *female breadwinner* and *dual earner* households.
- 4) We expect ALMP effects to be larger for women from former *no breadwinner* households than for women from former *male breadwinner* households.
- 5) ALMP effects are hypothesized to be greater for women from former *female breadwinner* than *dual earner* households.
- 6) We expect smaller ALMP effects for women in Eastern than in Western Germany.

5. Data and Method

For our analyses, we draw on the Integrated Employment Biography data set (IEB), as well as the Unemployment Benefit II History data set. These data sets provide longitudinal information on spells of employment, unemployment, benefit receipt, and program participation. The spells were prepared for scientific analysis on the basis of notifications sent by employers to health and pension insurance funds, as well as data collected by employment offices (Dorner *et al.*, 2010). An advantage of using data sets prepared from administrative sources is that they allow us to analyze detailed and very large sample sizes.

Our sample consists of women with a partner who entered into a state of UB II receipt without employment at any time between the 1st of October 2005 and the 31st of December 2007. We further limited our sample to the age range 30-64 because our analyses take sample members' employment history across the last ten years into account. Our observation window ends in December 2008.

We study the effects of One-Euro-Jobs and short-term classroom training programs on entries into regular, unsubsidized employment by means of a timing-of-events approach (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003b). In other words, we conduct simultaneous estimates of entries into One-Euro-Jobs, classroom training programs, and unsubsidized employment. Abbring and van den Berg (2003b) show that program effects are identifiable via a timing-of-events approach. For our specific research question, the possibility to account for selectivity in entering One-Euro-Jobs and classroom training programs via a timing-of-events approach is of particular importance. Women with a partner enter these labor market programs at lower rates than singles (Kopf and Zabel, 2014). Thus, program participations may be particularly selective for our sample, which, as described above, consists of women with a partner. The models that we estimate can contribute to understanding to what extent selectivity plays a role for findings of apparent ALMP effects for women, and whether employment effects remain even when such selectivity is controlled for.

Our model specification is given by the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln h_{ij}^O(t) &= y^O(t) + \sum_{k=1}^l \beta_k^O x_{ijk}(t) + \varepsilon_i^O \\ \ln h_{ij}^C(t) &= y^C(t) + \sum_{k=1}^l \beta_k^C x_{ijk}(t) + \varepsilon_i^C \\ \ln h_{ij}^E(t) &= y^E(t) + \sum_{k=1}^l \beta_k^E x_{ijk}(t) + \sum_{k=1}^4 \beta_{Ok}^E O_{ijk}(t) + \sum_{k=1}^4 \beta_{Ck}^E C_{ijk}(t) + \varepsilon_i^E \end{aligned}$$

$\rho_{\varepsilon^O \varepsilon^C}$
 $\rho_{\varepsilon^O \varepsilon^E}$
 $\rho_{\varepsilon^C \varepsilon^E}$

The first equation is for entries into One-Euro-Jobs, where the log transition rate into One-Euro-Jobs is represented by $\ln h_{ij}^O(t)$. In the second equation, $\ln h_{ij}^C(t)$ gives the log transition rates into classroom training programs, and $\ln h_{ij}^E(t)$ in the third equation is the log transition rate into regular, unsubsidized employment. The duration since the start of each spell is given by t , and is measured in days. We use a generalized Gompertz model for our baseline durations. That is, our log baseline transition rates are modelled as piece-wise linear functions of time ($y^O(t)$; $y^C(t)$; $y^E(t)$). In our particular models, we assume that the

gradients of each log baseline transition rate are constant within the time intervals 0-91, 91-183, 183-365, and 365-548 days after program start.

Our control variables are represented by $x_{ijk}(t)$ in each equation. These encompass age, nationality, level of education, health status, whether the sample member is handicapped, marital status, whether the partner is currently employed in a contributory job, whether the partner is currently marginally employed, whether the partner is currently participating in an active labor market program, the partner's current earnings, the partner's level of education, whether the couple has children, the number of children, age of the youngest child, calendar time, as well as regional-level indicators, including the unemployment rate, percentage of the unemployed receiving UB II, population density, gross domestic product (gdp) per capita, percentage of the population that is economically active, and the percentages of the economically active employed in different sectors.

In the equation for employment entries, the set of dummy variables $O_{ijk}(t)$ represents the duration of time since the start of a One-Euro-Job. We included four dummy variables indicating 0-3 months, 3-6 months, 6-12 month, and over 12 months since the start of the One-Euro-Job. As long as a person has not started a One-Euro-Job yet, all dummy variables take on the value zero. The coefficients β_{Ok}^E give the effect of participating in a One-Euro-Job on the transition rate into regular employment. Thus, the One-Euro-Job effect can vary with the duration since the start of the One-Euro-Job. Similarly, the set of dummy variables $C_{ijk}(t)$ indicates the duration of time since the start of a classroom training program, using the same time intervals as for One-Euro-Jobs, and the coefficients β_{Ck}^E give the effect of participating in a classroom training program on the transition rate into regular employment.

The individual-level error terms in the three equations are represented by ε_i^O , ε_i^C , and ε_i^E . Correlations between the error terms in each equation are given by $\rho_{\varepsilon^O\varepsilon^C}$, $\rho_{\varepsilon^O\varepsilon^E}$, and $\rho_{\varepsilon^C\varepsilon^E}$. For the error terms, a trivariate normal distribution is assumed. The distribution is approximated by numerical integration, using twelve support points per dimension (Lillard and Panis, 2003).

In our equations, the index i is person-specific, and the index j is specific to a spell. Each person can have several spells during which they are at risk. Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) show that multi-spell data facilitate the identification of the model. We estimated the models using the statistical software package aML (Lillard and Panis, 2003).

We aim to compare effects of One-Euro-Jobs and classroom training programs between different groups of women according to their previous division of labor in the household, and whether they were living in Eastern or Western Germany. Thus, we ran

separate estimations for eight different subgroups. We differentiated women (with a partner, aged 30-64) according to their division of labor in the household before entering our sample of non-employed UB II recipients, and then further differentiated by whether they were living in Eastern or Western Germany. For the operationalization of the former division of labor in the household, we drew on women's and their partner's 10-year earnings history. For each sample member and each partner of our sample members, we cumulated the individual's earnings across the last 10 years. We then calculated a common median over the individuals' 10-year cumulative earnings. Households in which both partners had earned less than the median were classified as *no breadwinner* households, those where the man had earned above the median but the woman below the median were termed *male breadwinner* households, those where the woman had earnings above the median and the man below we refer to as *female breadwinner* households, and when both partners had earnings above the median, we termed households *dual earner* households.

6. Results

Generally, ALMP effects are positive only for some group of women. We do find positive participation effects for women in Western Germany from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households, but not for the other groups. The first hypothesis, that we would generally find positive effects of participations in classroom training programs as well as in One-Euro-Jobs for the women in our sample, is therefore only partially supported.

Table 1 and 2 show the effects of classroom training and One-Euro-Jobs in Western (Table 1) and Eastern Germany (Table 2). The values shown in the tables are relative risks and give the factor by which transition rates into regular employment differ compared to the reference category (not participating in the program). Values above 1 indicate positive effects and values below 1 indicate negative effects.

We briefly give a first description of our general findings and then turn to evaluating our further more specific hypotheses. For Western German women from former *no earner* households, participating in classroom training raises transition rates into regular employment by 36% during the first three months after the start of training compared to non-participation (Table 1). The effect of classroom training then remains significantly positive even at longer durations since program start for this group. For women from former *male breadwinner*

households in Western Germany, we likewise find consistently positive effects of classroom training on transitions into regular employment, although the effect is not significant at 6-12 months after program start (Table 1).

Turning to One-Euro-Jobs, we find the initial negative lock-in effects that we expected for all groups of women both in Eastern and Western Germany. Over the first three and sometimes even 6 months after program start, transition rates into regular employment are significantly lower for One-Euro-Job participants than for non-participants. Following the initial lock-in effects, at durations of over 6 months after program start, we find significantly positive effects of One-Euro-Job participation on entries into regular employment only for women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households in Western Germany. Thus, positive participation effects are limited to the same two groups as for classroom training programs.

While the first hypothesis is thus only partially supported, our findings generally are in line with the second hypothesis. It stated that we would find greater program effects for women with low prior cumulative earnings (women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households) than for women with high prior cumulative earnings (women from former *female breadwinner* and *dual earner* households). In Western Germany, we find positive effects of both classroom training as well as One-Euro-Jobs (after initial lock-in effects) for women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households and no significant effects (after initial lock-in effects) for women from former *female breadwinner* and *dual earner* households. In Eastern Germany, we find mostly non-significant effects of classroom training and One-Euro-Jobs (after initial lock-in effects) for women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households. For women from former *female breadwinner* and *dual earner* households in Eastern Germany, we continue to find significantly negative effects of One-Euro-Job participations even beyond the expected duration of initial lock-in effects. Effects of classroom training programs for women from former *female breadwinner* households are mostly non-significant in Eastern Germany, and for women from former *dual earner* households they are even mostly significantly negative.

It thus appears that women with low former cumulative earnings, particularly in Western Germany, can indeed better profit from participating in One-Euro-Jobs and classroom training programs than women with higher former cumulative earnings. Perhaps there is indeed more potential for ALMPs to enhance the skills and improve the employment prospects of individuals who so far have only low employment experience or were only able to achieve low earnings in the past. In addition, women who have interrupted their

employment careers to care for their children may underestimate their employment opportunities, and ALMPs can help them get back in touch with the labor market and reassess their skills and options.

The third hypothesis stated that selectivity in ALMP participations for women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households should be greater than for those from former *female breadwinner* and *dual earner* households. Our findings support this hypothesis, at least for Western Germany. As can be seen in Table 1, the correlation of the error terms in the equation for entering One-Euro-Jobs and the equation for entering regular employment are positive for women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households in Western Germany. The correlation of the error terms for entries into classroom training programs and regular employment is likewise significant and positive for women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households, as well as for those from former *dual earner* households in western Germany. This indicates that for these groups of women, unobserved characteristics that positively influence entries into these two ALMPs also positively influence entries into regular employment. Such unobserved characteristics could for instance encompass a greater motivation to find employment. Had we not controlled for selectivity in ALMP entries, the estimated ALMP effects would have been even greater.

Our findings for Western Germany thus indicate that selectivity is more of an issue for women with lower former earnings and employment experience. As we argued earlier, finding employment requires more effort and motivation for them than for women with better employment prospects. Among women in former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households, perhaps especially those participate who are particularly motivated to take part in ALMPs to begin with. Among women from former *dual earner* and *female breadwinner* households, less exceptional motivation may be required to participate in ALMPs or to find employment.

For Eastern Germany, we generally find less evidence of selectivity in ALMP participations. Only for women from former *no breadwinner* households do we find a significant correlation of the error terms in the equations for entries into regular employment and into classroom training programs. The general pattern nonetheless appears to be similar as in Western Germany. While not significant for any of the other three groups of women, the size of this correlation is still larger for women in former *male breadwinner* households than for women in former *female breadwinner* or *dual earner* households. We do not find evidence of selectivity in entering One-Euro-Jobs for any of the four groups in Eastern Germany.

Hypotheses four and five compare the effects of two household types directly with each other. The fourth hypothesis stated that we would find larger ALMP effects for women from former *no breadwinner* households than for women from former *male breadwinner* households. We find only very limited support for this hypothesis. Effects of classroom training are indeed somewhat larger for women from former *no earner* households than for those from former *male breadwinner* households in Western Germany. Thus, perhaps classroom training programs can indeed help women from *no breadwinner* households, where none of the household members have much labor market experience, to gain access to the labor market. Women from former *male breadwinner* households might for instance be able to draw on their partner's experience when sending out applications, while application training courses could help women from former *no breadwinner* households compensate for the lack of such knowledge in the household. In Eastern Germany, we find a significantly negative effect of classroom training at over 12 months after program start for women from former *male breadwinner* households, but no significant effect for those from former *no breadwinner* households. So, classroom training at least does not prevent women from former *no breadwinner* households from entering regular employment in Eastern Germany. One-Euro-Job effects in Western Germany are neither consistently greater nor smaller for women from *no earner* than *male breadwinner* households. In Eastern Germany, no significant effects of One-Euro-Jobs are found for either group after initial lock-in effects. Perhaps One-Euro-Jobs cannot compensate for the type of knowledge or access to labor market networks that a partner with employment experience can bring into the household.

According to the fifth hypothesis, positive ALMP effects should be greater for women from former *female breadwinner* than *dual earner* households. However, we do not find any significantly positive effects for either group in Eastern or Western Germany. The initial lock-in effects in both parts of Germany as well as the further negative effects in Eastern Germany are of similar magnitude for the two groups. Perhaps the partner's resources are of less importance for the employment chances and ALMP effects of women whose own former cumulative earnings were fairly high. If their own application skills are quite good or they have access to helpful labor market networks themselves, the partner's additional resources may make less of a difference. Women from former *female breadwinner* and *dual earner* households generally do not seem to profit from participating in classroom training or One-Euro-Jobs. Perhaps the types of skills and work experience conveyed by these programs are of more use to individuals whose initial chances of employment are very low.

Our findings are indeed in line with the sixth hypothesis, that ALMPs would generally have less positive effects in Eastern than in Western Germany. This has already become obvious in the description of the results of the other hypotheses. While we find positive effects of classroom training programs and One-Euro-Jobs (after initial lock-in effects) for women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households in Western Germany, we find no significantly positive effects for Eastern Germany. In the case of women from former *female breadwinner* and *dual earner* households in Western Germany, we find no significant effects of classroom training programs or One-Euro-Jobs (after initial lock-in effects). In Eastern Germany, on the other hand, the ALMP effects for these two groups are negative. Perhaps women in Eastern Germany are indeed generally more employment-oriented than in Western Germany. Then, an explanation for their smaller ALMP effects in Eastern Germany could be that their wage elasticities are lower, and also that they might be less in need of ALMPs for motivation to take a first step towards re-entering the labor market.

So, overall, we find evidence that classroom training and workfare programs especially work for Western German women with less labor market experience and relatively low former cumulative earnings. These are women in former *male breadwinner* and former *no breadwinner* households. The ALMP effects tend to be greater for them, but this is independent of the partner's former cumulative earnings. The effects are especially evident in Western Germany, where the female employment rate is relatively low.

Table 1: Effects of One-Euro-Jobs and classroom training programs on transitions into regular employment in Western Germany. Relative risks.

	no earner	male breadwinner	female breadwinner	dual earner
duration since start of One-Euro-Job				
0-3 months	0.62 ***	0.75 **	0.60 ***	0.57 ***
3-6 months	0.93	1.19	0.84	0.74 **
6-12 months	1.23 *	1.43 ***	1.24	1.04
12 + months	1.99 ***	1.68 ***	1.03	0.86
duration since start of classroom training				
0-3 months	1.36 ***	1.19 **	0.89	0.93
3-6 months	1.49 ***	1.27 **	1.14	1.14
6-12 months	1.25 *	1.11	1.06	1.03
12 + months	1.60 ***	1.47 ***	0.99	0.87
standard dev. of heterogeneity distributions				
entries into One-Euro-Jobs	0.87 ***	1.13 ***	1.33 ***	0.99 ***
entries into class-room training	0.80 ***	0.79 ***	0.73 ***	0.77 ***
entries into regular employment	1.70 ***	1.70 ***	1.13 ***	1.22 ***
correlations of error terms				
One-Euro-Job/ classroom training entries	0.22	0.75 ***	-0.04	0.33
One-Euro-Job/ regular employment entries	0.19 ***	0.25 ***	-0.11	0.03
classroom training/ regular employment entries	0.15 **	0.46 ***	0.09	0.23 **
N	69,917	111,900	26,188	50,558
spells	91,400	154,709	36,478	72,053
Entries into One-Euro-Jobs	4,694	5,484	1,219	2,078
Entries into classroom training	4,030	5,820	1,446	2,613
Entries into regular employment	11,136	13,440	10,798	19,847

Significance: '*'=10%; '**'=5%; '***'=1%

Table 2: Effects of One-Euro-Jobs and classroom training programs on transitions into regular employment in Eastern Germany. Relative risks.

	no earner	male breadwinner	female breadwinner	dual earner
duration since start of One-Euro-Job				
0-3 months	0.38 ***	0.46 ***	0.19 ***	0.37 ***
3-6 months	0.53 ***	0.66 ***	0.53 ***	0.46 ***
6-12 months	0.77	1.05	0.54 ***	0.54 ***
12 + months	0.95	1.09	0.69 *	0.80 **
duration since start of classroom training				
0-3 months	0.86	0.98	0.88	0.77 ***
3-6 months	0.79	0.91	0.79	0.84
6-12 months	0.72	0.78	0.72	0.75 **
12 + months	0.90	0.62 **	0.43 **	0.42 ***
standard dev. of heterogeneity distributions				
entries into One-Euro-Jobs	1.23 ***	0.90 ***	1.24 ***	1.22 ***
entries into class-room training	0.78 ***	0.37 *	0.96 ***	0.63 ***
entries into regular employment	1.64 ***	1.79 ***	1.17 ***	1.26 ***
correlations of error terms				
One-Euro-Job/ classroom training entries	0.46 **	0.72	0.34	-0.11
One-Euro-Job/ regular employment entries	0.10	-0.03	0.00	-0.07
classroom training/ regular employment entries	0.60 ***	0.34	0.17	0.19
N	26,198	50,947	14,741	44,652
spells	34,441	78,452	20,821	68,320
Entries into One-Euro-Jobs	3,408	8,334	1,495	5,346
Entries into classroom training	1,382	2,964	621	1,931
Entries into regular employment	4,154	8,070	6,176	18,321

Significance: *'=10%; **'=5%; ***'=1%

7. Conclusion and Discussion

This paper investigates whether employment effects of ALMPs differ for women depending on their prior household role. In the international literature, stronger ALMP effects for women than for men have often been found. Nevertheless, evidence in Germany for short-term training and workfare effects is mixed. Explanations for women's ALMP effect premia tend to make assumptions about the household context, without taking it into account in analyses. Our article for the first time differentiates women by their prior division of labor in the

household when evaluating ALMP effects, in order to take the household context explicitly into account.

We focus on the evaluation of the effects of the two largest ALMPs for UB II recipients during our study period: classroom training and One-Euro-Jobs. We use rich administrative data and our sample consists of partnered women who entered into non-employment with UB II receipt between October 2005 and December 2007. The observation window ends in December 2008. We apply a timing-of-events approach for the evaluation of program effects.

Overall, we only find positive ALMP effects for some groups of women. Western German women from former *male breadwinner* and *no breadwinner* households profit more than other women.

Moreover, we do not find much evidence that the partner's resources influence the strength of classroom training and One-Euro-Job effects for women receiving means-tested UB II benefits in Germany. The effects of these ALMPs tend to be greater for women with low former cumulative earnings, independent of the partner's former cumulative earnings. Thus, it seems that short classroom training and One-Euro-Jobs can particularly help women with low individual resources to improve their employment chances, irrespective of their prior household role. We do not find any evidence of greater ALMP effects for women whose partners' comparatively high prior earnings might signal alternative options for them, such as taking up the homemaker role again in the future. If at all, it seems that classroom training programs are somewhat more beneficial for women whose partner had low prior employment experience and earnings. Perhaps courses such as application training can compensate for the lack of any such skills in the household.

One explanation for our lack of findings of differences in effects according to women's partners' prior cumulative earnings may also be that opposing effects of the partners' resources cancel each other out, as indicated in the theoretical considerations section. On the one hand, wage elasticities should be higher for women whose partner had higher cumulative earnings. Therefore, their ALMP effects could be higher. On the other hand, we argued that women might be able to profit from their partners' employment-specific resources when searching for a job, such as application skills or labor market networks. Women whose partners do not have such skills might be able to profit from application training courses instead. It is possible that both effects are present and cancel each other out.

Concerning participation selectivity, program participations are most selective for Western German women from former *male breadwinner* households. Nonetheless, this group

especially profits from ALMP participation, even after controlling for selectivity. It would, therefore, be useful to reduce the selectivity in order to reach women who really profit from participation.

Moreover, our paper concentrates on means-tested UB II recipients who are a difficult target group, given their long periods of unemployment and/or very low income. The effects could be different if we look at other unemployed women, who receive UI. Future research could evaluate programs for female UI recipients.

One intention of the Hartz IV employment policy reforms was to encourage persons who were previously not active on the labor market to search for employment. For households receiving means-tested UB II benefits, labor market entries by formerly non-employed women could contribute to reducing the households' benefit dependency. Active labor market programs, such as training and workfare, are meant to improve UB II benefit recipients' employment chances, and to contribute to activating the formerly inactive. Our findings indicate that short classroom training programs as well as workfare can indeed improve the employment chances of women with very low prior employment experience and earnings, at least in western Germany. Thus, it seems that participating in these ALMPs does contribute to the policy goal of activating the formerly inactive. While the employment chances of women from former *no earner* and *male breadwinner* households are improved, we do not have any information on further implications of their more frequent employment entries. Future research could for instance look into effects of employment entries on time shortages, stress, household expenses, as well as the overall well-being of women receiving UB II and that of their children.

8. Literature

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